Sobre os fundamentos filosóficos da memória episódica como consciência de eventos passados by Figueiredo, Nara M.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
DOSSIER
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
19(1):63-71, jan/apr 2018
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2018.191.07
ABSTRACT
Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experi-
mental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the 
ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving’s view on memory and con-
sciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed 
data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter 
Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether 
memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the 
conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow 
perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves ve-
ridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of 
past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by 
clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
Keywords: memory, episodic memory, awareness, private experiences.
RESUMO
Viagem mental no tempo é um novo conceito em filosofia. Ele foi inaugurado pelo psicó-
logo experimental e neurocientista cognitivo Endel Tulving nos anos 1980 e refere-se à 
habilidade de estarmos conscientes de eventos subjetivos passados e futuros. A concepção 
de Tulving de memória e consciência oferece uma importante distinção conceitual baseada 
em dados observados empiricamente. Neste texto eu discuto (1) seu conceito de memória 
episódica como consciência, baseada na distinção de Peter Hacker entre sensação e per-
cepção, e sua concepção de memória, e (2) se memória pode ser concebida como percep-
ção subjetiva do próprio corpo, que, consequentemente, desafia a concepção de memória 
como informação armazenada no cérebro e a ideia de que nós poderíamos de algum modo 
perceber nossas memórias. A principal dificuldade é: se consciência é um estado que envol-
ve percepção verídica de estados ou eventos internos presentes, como podemos conceber 
consciência de eventos passados e futuros? Essa discussão tem o objetivo de contribuir 
para a concepção de Tulving de viagem mental no tempo esclarecendo os fundamentos 
conceituais a partir dos quais podemos entender memória.
Palavras-chave: memória, memória episódica, consciência, experiências privadas.
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Introduction
The neural investigation of cognitive capacities has 
been opening several new ways of conceiving mental states 
and processes and how the brain makes them happen. Many 
times it is not possible to understand mental phenomena only 
by investigating their neural basis, for the interpretation of 
data collected from empirical investigation can be misleading 
when our concepts are not clear. Investing in objective inves-
tigation of mental phenomena requires a constant investment 
in conceptual clarification. In this paper I intend to present a 
conceptual clarification of the distinction between episodic 
and semantic memory made by Endel Tulving. To do this, 
I will make use of Peter Hacker’s philosophical investigation 
on the human nature and of Wittgensteinian epistemological 
per ectives, to finally conclude by suggesting a picture of2 
episodic memory that is compatible with a recent non-rep-
resentational, dynamic, theory of cognition presented by 
Anthony Chemero. This paper consists of a brief overview of 
Tulving’s main idea of awareness of our own memories and, 
subsequently, its incompatibility with recent theories of cog-
nition as radical embodied cognition.
I first present the concept of episodic memory as pro-
posed by Tulving and refer to empirical evidence that sup-
ports his claim. I also briefly mention a first distinction be-
tween experiences and knowledge, as sugge ed by Hacker. 
Then, I analyze the conceptual foundations of Tulving’s the-
ory exposing the direct and indirect pictures of perception 
from traditional philosophical views. Next, I compare the 
distinction between perception and sensation according to 
Hacker’s view to Tulving’s picture of episodic memory and 
highlight that memory is closer to sensation when it comes to 
the inner vs. outer picture3. After that, I consider the notion 
of awareness as a kind of knowledge together with Hacker’s 
picture of transitive and intransitive consciousness and pose 
the main problem addressed by the paper, namely how to 
conceive awareness of past and future events. The transitive 
vs. intransitive picture allows me to suggest that the main dis-
tinction presented by Tulving is between episodic memory 
and knowledge, as opposed to the distinction between kinds of 
objects of memory. The central issue is, then, evident: how to 
account for retention. This is where I bring a Wittgensteinian 
picture discrediting the private inner world and first-person 
knowledge pictures, given that both are matters of course and 
not matters of fact. Then, I expose the confusion between the 
capacity to remember and the objects of memory, compare 
this confusion with knowledge of private experience and refer 
to the non-epistemic value of this knowledge. Knowledge of 
the past and memory are interdependent concepts. One can-
not be inferred from the other for they are necessarily tied. 
I therefore suggest that episodic memory cannot be consid-
ered as awareness of the past, in Tulving’s terms, and finally 
refer to the notion of capacities and how it is compatible with 
recent theories of cognition as dynamic systems. 
Episodic memory4
According to Endel Tulving, episodic memory is a neu-
rocognitive5 hypothetical system that makes mental time 
travel possible. The central components of the system are 
(1) the self, (2) autonoetic awareness and (3) sense of sub-
jective time. These components can be briefly explained as 
follows: (1) the self is the subject, (2) this subject must be 
conscious of its own self, which is the subjective awareness 
of itself (autonoetic awareness) and (3) it has to have a sense 
that it is in the present, that there are past and future events, 
as well as, know that it is remembering past events when it 
remembers, in contrast to thinking that it is experiencing 
the event in the present. “The three clues—sense of sub-
jective time, autonoetic awareness, and self—point to three 
central components of a neurocognitive (mind/brain) sys-
tem that makes mental time travel possible. This (hypothet-
ical) system is called episodic memory” (Tulving, 2002, p. 2). 
Mental time travel is the ability to travel back into the past, 
or forth to the future, by either bringing to mind previous 
experienced episodes or mentally simulating future ones. 
“If there is hope for a more appropriate assessment of the 
uniqueness of episodic memory and autonoetic conscious-
ness, it may come through the realization that mental time 
travel involves awareness not only of what has been but also 
of what may come” (Tulving, 2002, p. 20).
Retrieval of episodic memories involves the 
conscious reliving of past events, a sort of 
mental journey into the past (Tulving 1983). 
In recent years, evidence has accumulated 
that the episodic memory system is also in-
volved in mental travel into the future, sug-
2 “Picture” is a term used by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. It can mean view, perspective, conception. The choice of 
the term is intentional, for it refers to Wittgenstein’s tradition and it has the connotation of a view that is many times imposed on us by 
our use of language, and, as the philosopher says, they can hold us captive: “A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, 
for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 115).
3 The inner vs. outer picture is a neoplatonist view, many times referred to by Peter Hacker, remounting to the idea that “[…] every 
activity in the world is in some sense double insofar as it possesses both an inner and an outer aspect. For example, […] thoughts and 
feelings (that are) internal to human beings express themselves in speech and actions” (Wildberg, 2016, Item 2).
4 In this paper, I am focusing on Tulving’s view until 2002, which is when he revises the concept of episodic memory in the paper “Epi-
sodic Memory: From Mind to Brain”.
5 “Episodic memory is a neurocognitive (brain/mind) system […]” (Tulving, 2002, p. 1). I take Tulving’s view as essentially involving a mind 
and brain Cartesian dualism as presented by Hacker and indirect realism. This should become clearer during the text.
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gesting a general concept of mental time 
travel (Suddendorf et al., 2009, p. 1317).
Episodic memory can be understood as the re-experi-
encing (or re-living) of past events involving more than just 
information about them. 
I proposed [in 1983 – Elements of Episod-
ic Memory] […] that episodic and semantic 
memory represented two functionally sep-
arable memory systems. […] two important 
features of episodic memory were missing. 
One had to do with the contents of what the 
subjects in the experiments had to learn. Ep-
isodic memory is about happenings in par-
ticular places at particular times, or about 
“what,” “where,” and “when” (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998, Nyberg et al., 1996). […] 
The other missing feature was what I referred 
to in Elements as “recollective experience”, 
or conscious awareness of what had hap-
pened in the past (Tulving, 2002, p. 3). 
Being able, for example, to recall the first time you, as a 
kid, were able to ride a bike, at the beach, with the wind blow-
ing on your face, and your fear or feeling of accomplishment, 
in other words, being able to re-live that experience in your 
mind is a paradigmatic case of episodic memory. This is con-
sidered in contrast to only remembering that you had a white 
bike, or only knowing how to ride a bike nowadays, without 
actually recalling your experience of learning it. In other 
words, knowing that you have been at the X beach when you 
learnt how to ride a bike is not enough to chara erize it as 
episodic memory. All this information is chara erized as se-
mantic memory. One may have semantic memory without 
having episodic memory.
The chara eristics of episodic memory are defined 
based on its contents6 or, more  ecifically, on the quality 
of its contents. The first distinction made by Tulving was 
between episodic and semantic memory which would be, 
roughly  eaking, personally experienced facts and general 
facts. In other words, memories can be memories of facts and 
be, therefore, informative (semantic memory) or they (mem-
ories) can be of first-person events and, therefore, essentially 
subject-related (episodic memory).7 Episodic memory was 
further on taken to be happenings in particular places at par-
ticular times, which was called the “www” criteria, meaning, 
where, when and what (Tulving, 2002), and more recently it 
is taken to be a more sophisticated combination of Ws, such 
as who did what to whom, or what happened to whom, when, 
where and why (Suddendorf et al., 2009).
Empirical investigation on episodic and semantic mem-
ory and mental time travel involves finding the neural basis 
responsible for them. Currently, memory of past events and 
simulation of future episodes have been strongly associated by 
the notion of mental time travel and they are taken to share a 
core neural network (Suddendorf et al., 2009). 
There is behavioral (and neural) evidence for the dis-
tinction of episodic and semantic memory, such as the cases 
of Clive Wearing, an English musician, and K.C., a man who 
suffered a serious brain damage in a motorcycle accident. Clive 
Wearing has neurological deficits on his hippocampus and a big 
loss of episodic memory, while his semantic memory is mostly 
intact, as well as his procedural memory, that allows him to re-
tain a normal vocabulary, recognize his family, and play the pi-
ano (Suddendorf et al., 2009). K.C. had extensive brain lesions 
in multiple cortical and sub-cortical areas, including medial 
temporal lobes, and presented severe amnesia after the trauma, 
although his cognitive capacities where intact (Tulving, 2002).
The evidence is based on cases of neural impairment 
and behavioral deficits (Tulving, 2002) and there is no con-
ceptual problem in identifying parts of the brain, such as the 
hippocampus and the medial temporal lobe as the neurolog-
ical basis of the capacity for remembering (Hacker, 2013). 
Similarly, there is nothing wrong with “the hypothesis that 
episodic memory and imagination, are both constructive pro-
cesses which depend on the same neural systems” (Gerrans 
and Sander, 2013, p. 700). Neither with the idea that mental 
time travel is a human capacity probably due to cognitive evo-
lutionary adaptation, tied to the development of the prefron-
tal cortex (Gerrans and Sander, 2013).
The very distinction between kinds of memory is (also) 
not, in principle, conceptually problematic. In many cases we 
meaningfully say that remembering is retaining8 information 
previously acquired (Hacker, 2013) and we certainly learn and 
teach, get and give information on the basis of our capacity for 
remembering them. This is what Tulving calls semantic mem-
ory. Episodic memory, on the other hand, cannot be framed in 
the same structure, for enjoying a meal or a concert, and being 
thrilled with your first bike ride at the beach, is not acquiring 
information about the meal, the concert or the bike. In these 
cases, although one can also acquire information about these 
6 “[…] the term [episodic memory] is often used to describe the specific experience (content) that comes to mind […]” (Tulving and 
Szpunar, 2009). I will refer to this text at the end of this paper.
7 The specification of episodic memory can be considered from different perspectives. One of them are the neurological processes in 
the brain that can justify the existence of a system responsible for episodic memory. I am not referring to this one. I am referring to the 
conceptual structure of episodic memory. This means that I will not deny that there can be a neurological system of episodic memory 
nor that neurological facts can provide explanation. I will clarify the philosophical foundations and suggest that some characteristics of 
the definition of episodic memory cannot be sustained given the arguments of Hacker, Wittgenstein and Hamilton.
8 Hacker offers three “suggestions [to] emphasize the nexus of memory with knowledge previously acquired […]”: (1) “To remember 
something is to have learnt it and not forgotten”, (2) “To remember is to retain information previously acquired” (3), “To remember is to 
know now something one knew previously and to know it now because one knew it previously” (Hacker, 2013, p. 319).
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episodes, namely, the address of the theater and the menu op-
tions in the re aurant, remembering one’s own experiences 
is not retaining information that one has acquired (Hacker, 
2013), just as one’s own private experiences cannot be taught. 
Although one’s own private experiences can be expressed and 
one can certainly teach another person how to ride a bike and 
how to appreciate food and music, private experiences differ 
from acquired information regarding their transmissibility. 
Information can be transmitted and multiplied, while private 
experiences are defined as essentially individual. 
Understanding the 
conceptual basis
In considering that episodic memory is awareness of 
past events Tulving assumes that the subject is having (recall-
ing), at the present time, the mental experience she had in 
the past while she (1) is aware that it happened in the past, 
(2) that the present moment is not the past moment and (3) 
that she (the subject) is at the present time. This conception 
of memory is fundamentally based on traditional ideas in an-
alytic philosophy such as “to remember is to have a present 
representation of a past experience” (Hacker, 2013, p. 329) 
and “perception gives us knowledge of the present, expec-
tation gives us opinion of the future, and memory gives us 
knowledge of the past or “access” to past experience” (Hacker, 
2013, p. 320). These ideas can be seen both in Tulving’s own 
writings: “[…] when we do travel back in time, our conscious 
awareness of our experience is different from our ordinary 
“on-line” awareness of our environment” (Tulving, 2002, p. 2) 
and in the literature about mental time travel that is based on 
Tulving’s definitions: “[…] instances of intelligent future-di-
rected behaviour that seem to involve the representation of 
information about past and future contingencies unavailable 
in the current experience” (Gerrans and Sander, 2013, p. 700).
Tulving takes awareness as a state of consciousness di-
rected to its object. He endorses the idea that we can be aware 
of our private experiences, implying, therefore, the roots of 
traditional representational views that take inner states as 
objects of perception. In other words, saying that we perceive 
our inner experiences is placing an intermediary element be-
tween the subject and what he perceives (indirect realism). 
This picture of memory and perception comes from tra-
ditional causal theories of perception (e.g., Locke) that hold 
that we perceive directly ideas and these ideas are caused by 
objects (Hacker, 2013). In other words, perceptual experience 
was considered to be sense impressions (sense data) caused by 
objects of perceptual experience. These causal theories are in-
direct accounts of perception. That we possess these sense im-
pressions would be an explanation for non-veridical but sim-
ilar experiences, such as illusions, dreams and hallucinations.
The classical causal theory of perception 
was the product of synthesizing a rudi-
mentary neurophysiological explanation of 
perception with (a) a metaphysical distinc-
tion between how we perceive the world 
and how it is independently of our percep-
tions of it (the primary-/ secondary-quality 
distinction), (b) a misconceived notion of 
what is given in perception, namely ideas, 
that are the immediate objects of percep-
tion, and (c) the supposition that words are 
names of ideas (Hacker, 2013, p. 303).
On this account, it seems that episodic memory can be 
awareness of past events, for this could be explained in terms 
of sense impressions that we are aware of. Awareness of past 
events could be the awareness of an inner state/event, imagi-
nary and intermediate. On the other hand, 
On a direct knowledge account, as opposed 
to the indirect knowledge of the image the-
ory, memory yields unmediated knowledge 
of the past. On this view, the immediate 
objects of memory are past things and not 
present ideas. These objects are intention-
al, that is, objects of thought or judgement, 
not awareness. Just as fictional entities such 
as unicorns can be objects of thought, so 
can past objects (Hamilton, 2017, p. 551, 
emphasis added).
In this sense, we do not perceive inner objects. As it is 
not my intention to defend direct realism in this paper, but to 
expose the confusions of indirect cognition, let us now briefly 
consider perceptions, that involve external objects, and sen-
sations, that could be genuine cases of perception of inner 
objects. Perceptions have to be distinguished from sensations, 
Hacker says. Having a sensation (of pain, for example) is not 
to perceive anything. In other words, having sensations is not 
to perceive objects of any kind, for objects exist whether they 
are perceived or not, as opposed to sensations that exist only 
when felt (Hacker and Bennett, 2003). The distinctions be-
tween perception and sensation go further than that. There 
are borderline cases such as touch, but the main point defend-
ed by Hacker is that “one can have sensations in most organs 
and parts of the body, but there are no organs of sensation. By 
contrast, there are organs of perception […]” (Hacker, 2013, 
p. 288), such as ears for hearing, eyes for seeing and so on9. 
Hacker argues that sensations are physical and defends 
that the main confusion in our understanding of sensations 
9 It is worth mentioning that he considers tact as a borderline case and holds the distinction between perception and sensation by specify-
ing the difference between sensations and tactile qualities of things. “Feeling hot (which may be a localized sensation, as when one’s feet 
are burning, or a sensation of overall bodily condition, as when one feels hot after vigorous exercise) is not the same as feeling the thermal 
qualities of things. One may feel heat without feeling hot, and one may feel hot without being hot or feeling heat” (Hacker, 2013, p. 265).
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is that we take them to be consciously present to our minds 
(as if we were aware of them). The expression “being aware of 
sensations”, according to Hacker, is a conceptual confusion, for 
there is no sensation that one is not aware of. Feeling (sensa-
tion) is being aware of it. We can neither doubt nor be certain 
that we sense (we can have doubts about what the feeling is, 
but not if we feel).
If we accept Hacker’s distinctions, the concept of epi-
sodic memory can be said to be closer to sensations than to 
perceptions when it comes to its “objects”. For one cannot re-
member (episodically) without being aware of it. Not being 
aware, in this case, is not remembering episodes.10
In his philosophical analysis, Hacker suggests that 
awareness is (one kind of) transitive consciousness in con-
trast to intransitive consciousness (like being awake, or not 
in a coma). Being transitive means that it involves an object 
of consciousness/awareness11. “Consciousness of something is 
generally a form of knowledge of what one is conscious of ” 
(Hacker, 2013, p. 25). But what is it that one is aware of when 
one remembers an episode? What is the object of my aware-
ness? What is it that I know? In this sense, episodic memory 
is not a kind of knowledge12. 
Transitive consciousness is taken to be a form of knowl-
edge and, therefore, is fa ive-related (related to facts and 
events). It is also tied to cognitive receptivity. (Hacker, 2013). 
One cannot be aware of what is not the case. In other words, I 
cannot be aware that things are such and such, if they are not. 
Thus, awareness is not like expectations, hopes and fears, for 
I can expect, hope and fear what is not actually going to hap-
pen. Awareness is transitive and object-dependent; I cannot 
be aware of what is not there. Despite that, I can be aware of 
absence when something that I expected is not present. But 
this only means that one can be aware of what is expressed 
by negation, although one cannot be aware of what is not the 
case. This means that one does not perceive absence, one in-
fers absence. For example, I can be aware that there are no 
balloons in the sky, when there should be, but I cannot be 
aware that there are balloons when there are none.
Our problem is: if awareness is a conscious state that in-
volves veridical perception (or sensation) of present inner or 
outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past 
and future events?
To be conscious of something is not to be 
in a mental state, although what one is 
conscious of may, sometimes, be a mental 
state, as when one is conscious of one’s 
anxiety. The reason for this is perhaps the 
conceptual link between being conscious of 
something and knowing something. For to 
know something to be so is not to be in a 
mental state of any kind, but to be able to 
do various things in the light of what one 
knows, that is, of information one possesses 
(Hacker, 2013, p. 22).
And yet episodic memory involves consciousness/
awareness of something that is not semantic knowledge, but 
is considered as a kind of knowledge.
Let us assume that there are three different 
kinds of memory, or three memory systems: 
procedural, semantic, and episodic (Tul-
ving, 1983). They are alike in that they all 
make possible the utilization of acquired 
and retained knowledge. But they differ 
in the kind of knowledge that they handle, 
and in the ways in which different kinds of 
knowledge are acquired or used (Tulving 
1985, p. 2, emphasis added).
The central problem of memory is accounting for re-
tention (Faria, 2017). How is memory to be retained? Is it 
knowledge stored in the brain? If not literally, then, in what 
sense? If we are aware of something that is not present in fact, 
are we aware of something that is inside of us, in our mind, in 
our brain? How am I to be aware of something in my brain? 
These questions can be traced back to the very nature of the 
mind and can lead us back to the Cartesian dualism between 
mind and body in its contemporary version, namely the mind 
and brain duality (Hacker and Bennett, 2003). Naturally, I 
will not solve these issues, but I will offer an alternative pic-
ture, based on Wittgenstein, that can help to clarify how to 
make sense of awareness of past events. 
Wittgenstein discredited any picture that involves con-
ceiving the mind in the model of an inner private world. 
Thoughts, feelings, sensations, emotions, memory and all the 
inner states are mistakenly understood in the model of ob-
jects and attributed as private and exclusive objects. 
The distinction between semantic and episodic memo-
ry presented by Tulving is between the retention of acquired 
knowledge and the ability to call to mind past events (of the 
personal past). Calling to mind personal past events is essen-
tially subject-dependent, in other words, memory of past 
events are first-person experiences. In a Wittgensteinian pic-
ture, first-person experiences are not objects of knowledge, 
but conditions for knowledge. 
10 This might be controversial if one accepts, as Gerrans and Sander, that there are supposedly episodic non-conscious processes that 
influence decision making. I am considering Tulving’s definitions and taking episodic memory only at the conscious level.
11 Hacker (2013) considers that although one cannot be conscious without being aware of something, one can be aware of something 
without being actually conscious of it when, for example, one has been informed of something but does not have that in mind. For 
the purposes of this paper, we will consider awareness as conscious awareness only, for this is what is considered by Tulving when he 
characterizes episodic memory.
12 See below the non-epistemic value of first-person experiences.
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To make this distinction (objects of knowledge vs. con-
ditions for knowledge) clear I present the analogy with an 
abacus borrowed from Nicholas Shea13. “[…] to figure out 
what an abacus does by plotting the physical dynamics of 
beads on wires […] might give you a reasonable grip on the 
trajectories of the beads but would entirely lose sight of the 
calculations being performed” (Shea, 2013, p. 1063). An aba-
cus can be defined as an instrument for calculating. We can 
use the physical properties of the abacus, namely, the tension 
and trajectory of the beads sliding, the chemical compounds 
of the material and so on, to explain what an abacus is. This 
is one a ect of the explanation of the abacus and it does not 
exhaust what an abacus is. That the abacus possesses those 
physicochemical properties is a condition for it to be an aba-
cus (one of the conditions). These properties say nothing 
about the calculation. That it can be used according to the 
rules of calculation is also a condition for it to be an abacus. 
Or, in other words, that there are rules of how the abacus 
works is also a condition for it to be an abacus. The analogy 
stands for the brain and the mind, re ectively.
So, it is not because there are rules that an abacus is an 
abacus (the rules do not justify the fact that it is an abacus), 
but the fact that there are rules is a condition14 for it to be an 
abacus (the rules make it the abacus). However, only the rules 
are not the abacus, but they are a condition (one of them) for 
it to be. Analogously, it is not because I look at my private 
experiences that I know what they are, but rather, they sim-
ply are. The fact that I have private experiences is a condition 
(one of them) for me to talk about understanding, remem-
bering, perceiving (and all other mental capacities). They do 
not justify my knowledge of them. They are a condition for 
my ascriptions of knowledge. This should become clearer in 
the next paragraph. It refers to private experiences not pro-
viding inferential basis for memory claims.
In a Wittgensteinian view, private experiences do not 
have an epistemic value. They are not subjected to truth val-
ues, truth conditions, nor justification.
In what sense are my sensations private? – 
Well, only I can know whether I am really in 
pain; another person can only surmise it. – 
In one way this is false, and in another non-
sense. If we are using the word “know” as it 
is normally used (and how else are we to use 
it?), then other people very often know if 
I’m in pain. – Yes, but all the same, not with 
the certainty with which I know it myself! – It 
can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps 
as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean – except perhaps that I 
am in pain? 
Other people cannot be said to learn of my 
sensations only from my behaviour – for I 
cannot be said to learn of them. I have them 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, § 246).
This shows us that there is a conceptual confusion be-
tween the capacity/ability to remember (episodically) and 
the objects of memory (what one remembers). In a Wittgen-
steinian picture, images and experiences may accompany the 
capacity but do not constitute it. “When I say: ‘He was here 
half an hour ago’ – that is, remembering it – this is not the 
description of a present experience. Memory-experiences 
are accompaniments of remembering” (Wittgenstein, 2009, 
§ 368, Fragment). Wittgenstein rejected the idea that inner 
experiences can provide inferential basis for memory claims 
(Hamilton, 2017).
That remembering is epistemically and ontologically in-
ner is a matter of course15, not of fact. This means: there is 
nothing that counts as non-personal remembering. We mis-
understand what first-person psychological states are when 
we conceive them as inner objects, after the assumption that 
they are essentially inner. And this puts us in the search of 
chimeras, such as, the supposed state of knowing (awareness) 
that I am remembering. As Hacker says, remembering is not 
knowing now something that I have known ye erday.
Remembering that one had a headache 
yesterday is not to know now something 
one came to know yesterday. For as we 
have seen, it makes no sense to speak of 
coming to know that one has a headache. 
To remember one’s youth is the ability to 
dwell on, recollect and recount experienc-
es enjoyed or undergone in one’s youth – 
one’s falling in love for the first time, the ex-
citement of youthful adventures, the delight 
in coming to understand things. This would 
be distorted by being represented as know-
ing now something one knew previously 
(Hacker, 2013, p. 320).
Naturally, this does not mean that we do not know that 
we are remembering. There is no doubt that the capacity for 
remembering necessarily involves knowing one is remember-
ing in contrast to actually experiencing something, imagining 
or hallucinating, for example. This knowledge is, neverthe-
less, not epistemically significant, as it is not knowledge of any 
kind, for it is not subjected to truth conditions nor to justifi-
13 Shea does not claim that physical explanations cannot shed light on mental phenomena. Neither do I. I am using his example to high-
light that the physicochemical explanations are one aspect of what we try to explain when we are talking about mental phenomena. And 
that physicochemical processes are a condition for those phenomena rather than the phenomena themselves.
14 I do not want to say pre-condition because it is not supposed to be prior.
15 “A matter of course” as opposed to a “matter of fact”. Facts can occur or not and, therefore, factual claims can be true or false. Mat-
ters of course are those indubitable claims such as: “Only I can feel my pain” that are not subjected to truth conditions.
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cation – one simply remembers. Remembering is essentially 
distinct from experiencing, imagining and hallucinating, due 
to its pra ical temporal connections (what happens before 
and after) and its place in social pra ices (in what cases we 
say that one remembers, imagines or hallucinates and how 
we teach someone what remembering, imagining and hallu-
cinating are). “Knowing I’m remembering” is nothing more 
than remembering, for there is no such thing as not knowing 
I am remembering (episodically). If I remember, I know I re-
member. If I do not know I remember, I am not remembering 
– I might be having a delusion or just not remembering at 
all. What distinguishes the capacity for remembering is not 
any other cognitive power (as knowing, believing, sensing). 
What distinguishes and chara erizes this capacity are prac-
tices. These concepts (knowing, remembering, believing) are 
defined interdependently in our pra ices (having private ex-
periences is a condition for distinction, not the element that 
distinguishes them).
One might bring the question: “Does he know that it is 
memory because it is caused by something past? And how does 
he know what the past is? After all, a person learns the concept 
of the past by remembering” (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 370, Frag-
ment). The point here is once again inter-defined concepts: 
memory and knowledge of the past are inter-defined. They 
depend on each other, rather than explain each other. This sug-
gests a holistic conceptual picture (Hamilton, 2017).
Episodic memory cannot be awareness of past events 
if we conceive awareness as the conscious transitive state 
sugge ed by Hacker. Also, the concept of episodic memory 
should not lead us to the search for the neural basis of this 
state of awareness. This is conceptually confused. Like “paying 
attention”, awareness cannot be disconnected from the object 
of my attention, although it should not be defined as the ob-
ject of my attention. In other words, there seems to be no in-
dividuating means to find a neural basis of awareness, for it is, 
by definition (in its essence), object-directed.
None of the kinds of memory (episodic, semantic or 
procedural) nor memory in general imply that there is infor-
mation or private experiences stored in the brain (in the tra-
ditional computational view), although one needs one’s brain 
functioning properly in order to have the capacities required 
for remembering (such as retention). And our capacity to re-
member should not be confused with what we remember, or 
the “objects of our memory”. The kinds of memory are defined 
by our conceptions. The disassociation between episodic and 
semantic memory has its place in our understanding of mne-
monic capacities. These capacities may need either distinct or 
common biological structures as their basis (Hacker, 2013).
Capacity-based investigations are taken to be less 
problematic than content-based16 ones, for they rely on the 
function of an area based on impairment in case of damage, 
not on the content. This is taken to be genuine localization 
of capacities such as remembering, despite the challenge 
of brain plasticity, which threatens claims of localization. 
In addition to that, connectionist cognitive theories, the 
idea that information is distributed in the brain rather than 
localized, seem to be a more promising contemporary view 
(Hamilton, 2017).
Episodic memory can be conceived not as being aware 
of one’s own past experiences, but as a capacity for recol-
lecting events. (This capacity is not to be confused with the 
contents of my memory – with what I remember). This 
picture is better suitable to recent approaches in cognitive 
sciences involving dynamic systems that explain cognition 
as embodied capacities, such as radical embodied cognition 
(REC), because it rejects the necessity of inner private ob-
jects of memory. REC can be shortly described as follows: 
“A dynamical system is a set of quantitative variables chang-
ing continually, concurrently, and interdependently over 
time in accordance with dynamical laws that can, in princi-
ple, be described by some set of equations” (Chemero, 2009, 
p. 25). Embodied cognition is not necessarily non-represen-
tationalist. Although defenders of embodied cognition try 
to avoid explaining behavior in terms of mental representa-
tions, they do make use of such tools, such as the concept of 
memory, in some cases. Nevertheless, in its radical version 
(Chemero, 2009), there is a shift of per ective that ex-
cludes the use of representations as explanatory tools and 
substitutes it with mathematical models that explain brain 
functioning in given situations, a ions and behaviours.
I hereby define radical embodied cognitive 
science as the scientific study of perception, 
cognition, and action as necessarily embod-
ied phenomenon, using explanatory tools 
that do not posit mental representations. 
It is cognitive science without mental gym-
nastics17 (Chemero, 2009, p. 29).
What does it change? We still have the question wheth-
er scrub-jays18 have the capacity for recollecting events. Yes, 
we do. What it changes is the way how we may interpret 
data collected from neuroimaging experiments, for example. 
We can shift from content-driven neuro-basis to neuro-basis 
of capacities. Changing this approach and shifting from con-
tent-based conceptual structures to capacity-based ones may 
help to clarify empirical research and deal with conceptual 
16 See “trace theory” for more details in Hacker (2013, p. 340) and Hamilton (2017, p. 552).
17 Mental gymnastics: “the construction, manipulation, and use of representations of the world, and there are those who believe that the 
business of cognition is to do something else” (Chemero, 2009, p. 18).
18 Scrub-jays are birds that retrieve their previously stored food sooner when it is a worm, which degrades sooner, and later when it is a 
nut, which lasts longer. This behavior could indicate that they know what happened, where it happened and when it happened, which 
are the basic “www” criteria for episodic memory, mentioned in the first section (Suddendorf et al., 2009).
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problems, such as private experiences conceived as objects, 
the individuation of intentional states, and so on19.
Besides that, as we mentioned before, intentional state 
concepts are inter-defined in our pra ices. In Hacker’s 
words,
[…] we do say that our dog believes it is go-
ing to be taken for a walk when, on hear-
ing us take its leash off the peg, it rushes 
excitedly to the door, barking and wagging 
its tail. The fact that it cannot say that it is 
about to be taken for a walk, let alone that 
it cannot say that it believes it is about to be 
taken for a walk, is immaterial. Its behaviour 
warrants ascription of belief or expectation 
to it (Hacker, 2013, p. 92).
It is worth mentioning, even extrapolating the aims 
of this paper, that, from this perspective, we could, for ex-
ample, assume that scrub-jays expect and remember based 
on their behavior and search for the neural basis of their 
capacities. This would not allow us to directly infer episod-
ic memory because of its special phenomenology, name-
ly the conscious recollection of past events, since we do 
not watch birds daydreaming, smiling and crying, which 
are some of the criteria we can use to ascribe recollection, 
other than linguistic expressions. But this is a topic to be 
further investigated. 
It is also worth mentioning that Tulving himself ac-
knowledges that episodic memory can be understood as a 
capacity. In more recent publications he mentions that it can 
be considered as a capacity of the brain when the subject re-
members a  ecific experience.
In this article, the term “episodic memory” 
refers to a unique memory system (or ca-
pacity) of the brain. However, that is not the 
only meaning of episodic memory that one 
will find in the literature. For instance, the 
term is often used to describe the specific 
experience (content) that comes to mind 
when exercising the capacity of episod-
ic memory and the accompanying feeling 
(phenomenology) that one is currently re-
living that previous experience (Tulving and 
Szpunar, 2009).
A Hackerian reader would suggest, based on his 
extensive explanation of the mereological fallacy20, that 
this is still imprecise, for remembering is a capacity of the 
subject and not of the brain. But this is a topic for further 
investigation.
Discussion and 
concluding remarks
The concept of episodic memory is tied to the caus-
al-representational framework for it shares the idea that 
there is a common experiential content between living/expe-
riencing events and recalling them that grants remembering 
(Illusions, hallucinations and dreams are also taken to have 
the same experiential content as veridical perception). The 
problem that this framework poses is: how to conceive aware-
ness of past events as awareness of something that is not pres-
ent, but is it not also a mental representation?
We have sugge ed that awareness cannot be awareness 
of past experiences for two main reasons; first, because there 
is no such thing as knowledge of our own inner states (assum-
ing that our past experiences are retained innerly), second, 
because awareness is of something that we are able to drive 
our attention to (something that is present), and, since the 
past is not present, it cannot be awareness of the past. (Unless 
we are aware of some inner state). The idea of an inner object 
accounting for memory and other intentional states can be 
dismissed in direct realism, but this still leaves us with the im-
possibility of awareness of what is not present. 
Whether awareness should be taken as transitive is a 
contingent matter. We can define it in the way that fits our 
purposes for describing the processes we are referring to. 
There are compelling reasons for that, though. Awareness is 
mostly conceived as awareness of something. This is not only 
how we use the word “awareness” but mainly how it serves 
our purposes – how we conceive it. Given that we do conceive 
awareness  as awareness of something, we are in need of ex-
plaining what the awareness of the past is. For, if the object of 
my awareness no longer exists, I could not, in theory, be aware 
of it. This picture gives us grounds to reject Tulving’s concep-
tion of episodic memory as awareness of past experiences.
Furthermore, although episodic memory can be defined 
as our capacity for recalling past events and although we can 
infer that brain a ivity represents public events when there is 
a correlation between them (Carvalho and Figueiredo, 2017), 
this does not imply that memory is information stored in the 
brain. Also, although we can say that memory is retained in-
formation that one has acquired previously, episodic memory 
(remembering one’s own experiences) is not retaining infor-
mation – in the sense that it cannot be transmitted.
Nevertheless, rejecting Tulving’s picture of awareness 
of past events certainly does not dismiss the very notion of 
episodic memory, which can and, as we argue, should be con-
sidered in the model of capacities. Considering episodic mem-
ory as a capacity means that we would not be relying on its 
19 The first example is precisely the center of this paper, namely, whether private experiences should be conceived in the model of ob-
ject-name relation. See Wittgenstein (2009, § 293). A second example, among many, is the individuation of intentional states depending 
on its objects. For an overview on this topic see Bourget and Mendelovici (2017) and Jacob (2014). Extensive bibliography is suggested.
20 The misattribution of properties of the subject to its parts.
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objects to account for its existence. And this view is compati-
ble with other models of explanation of cognition.
I hope that my considerations in this paper show that 
we should take mental concepts more carefully and pursue 
a higher level of precision and clarity. It might be the case 
that there is no such thing as precision when it comes to the 
concepts of mental powers, but if scientific investigation is 
to be performed based on these concepts, we should invest 
in finding criteria for discernment in addition to (or before) 
drawing conclusions about brain a ivity that is associated 
with these concepts.
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